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ARBITRATING HUMAN RIGHTS
Roger P. Alford *
INTRODUCTION
Corporate liability for human rights abuses is one of the most
important developments in current international law and practice.
Since the inception of the human rights litigation revolution just over
twenty-five years ago,1 victims have faced little hope of securing genu-
ine redress. Claims against sovereign entities foundered on the rocks
of sovereign immunity. Claims against individual perpetrators were
occasionally successful in securing judgments, but even successful
claimants almost never collected on the judgments. For years human
rights litigation appeared to be an act of public shaming-somewhat
effective as a tool of embarrassment, but of little use to genuinely com-
pensate victims or punish violators.2 But with the advent of human
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Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
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1 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); HENRY J. STEINER &
PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1049 (2d ed. 2000).
2 See Rosemary Nagy, Post-Apartheid Justice: Can Cosmopolitanism and Nation-Build-
ingBe Reconciled?, 40 LAw & Soc'v REv. 623, 627-28 (2006) (" [T]he moral and politi-
cal symbolism of the litigation is just as significant as the unsettled question of legal
culpability. Even successful alien tort claims rarely collect damages; they are usually
filed with goals of affording victims a measure of recognition and respect, of publicly
shaming those responsible for human rights violations, and of perhaps instigating
change outside the courtroom."); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff's
Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 102, 106 ("The impact of such cases has
been greater in theory than in practice .... Filartiga and its progeny have created an
opening in this rule, but one too narrow for lawsuits against those most responsible
for human rights violations abroad-namely, leaders and governments-since they
tend to be protected by sovereign immunity. At the same time, the effect of these civil
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rights litigation against corporations, there is now the prospect of a
deep-pocket defendant that is complicit in grave human rights abuses,
subject to personal jurisdiction, and not immune from suit. This
development became an "existential"3 moment in the history of
human rights litigation, with both victims and corporations cognizant
of the genuine risks and rewards of human rights litigation.
However, an honest appraisal of this current trend raises troub-
ling questions. One has a nagging suspicion that human rights litiga-
tion against corporations is a proxy fight in which the accomplice is
pursued while the principal evades punishment. Indeed, if a corpora-
tion is accused of "aiding and abetting" human rights abuses, this is all
but a concession that the corporate actor is not the principal wrong-
doer. It is of course possible that this controversial trend toward cor-
porate responsibility may reflect a genuine concern about corporate
abuse of power. But more likely it reflects an abiding frustration that
the primary perpetrators-sovereigns-are beyond the reach of most
victims. If victims cannot pursue claims against the principal, they will
resign themselves to pursue claims against those who aid and abet.
How have we come to this state of affairs, in which the corpora-
tion is pursued while the sovereign evades punishment? Why should
the corporate accomplice alone be found liable if the sovereign is the
primary malfeasor? For the first time in scholarly literature, this Arti-
cle suggests an alternative approach, a solution to this conundrum. It
suggests that corporations have existing tools to remedy the situation,
drawing on principles derived from human rights, contract law, and
arbitration. The essential idea is that if a corporation is found liable
for aiding and abetting human rights abuse, it may invoke contractual
provisions in the agreement with the sovereign to arbitrate the ques-
tion of shared responsibility. While the victims may not pursue the
sovereign, there is no impediment for a corporation that is found lia-
ble to pursue the sovereign in arbitration to secure its share of liabil-
ity, either in the form of contribution or indemnification. In short,
suits in fostering respect for human rights has been uncertain at best. The massive
judgments ... that the courts entered against Karadlit and others have gone unpaid.
For the moment, then, the principle benefit of these suits to their plaintiffs is the
public attention they generate.").
3 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Promo-
tion and Protection of Human Rights, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secre-
tary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, 16, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) (prepared by
John Ruggie) [hereinafter Ruggie Interim Report], available at http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/110/27/pdf/G0611027.pdfOpenElement.
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human rights litigation against the corporation could lead to "who
pays" arbitration against the sovereign.
But the tools of contract law and arbitration are not simply for
the corporation that aids and abets human rights abuse. They also are
tools available to the vast majority of corporations that are good cor-
porate citizens and wish to contract for compliance with basic human
rights. For these corporations, contract law and arbitration proce-
dures create opportunities to impose human rights obligations on
contractors, vendors, and suppliers. Human rights obligations can be
internalized by contract and subjected to effective dispute resolution
procedures, including international arbitration. Such provisions may
be included out of genuine reflection of concern for such human
rights, or to minimize bad publicity or accusations of legal complicity
in human rights violations.
Finally, some corporations may wish to go even further and create
opportunities for noncontracting parties-such as employees or non-
governmental organizations-to invoke third-party beneficiary rights
to facilitate compliance with human rights embedded in the contract.
Not unlike the third-party beneficiary rights that corporations enjoy
pursuant to bilateral investment treaties, corporations could empower
relevant third-party stakeholders to invoke contractual social responsi-
bility clauses against those contracting parties who violate their
commitments.
This Article begins in Part I by briefly outlining the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, which has proven to be the principal impedi-
ment to pursuing human rights claims directly against the sovereign
in domestic courts. Plaintiffs have tried in vain to hold sovereigns
accountable by articulating convoluted arguments that the human
rights abuses fall within one of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
exceptions. Part II then summarizes the debate regarding corporate
responsibility under international law and outlines the growing trend
of holding corporations liable for human rights violations. Courts
increasingly are concluding that corporate responsibility for human
rights violations flows from the corporation's ties to the sovereign,
especially when the corporation aids and abets a violation, performs
government functions, or authorizes government actors to engage in
such abuse. Part III addresses the critical step that is missing in most
human rights litigation involving corporations: arbitrating who pays
for the human rights abuse. Most relationships between sovereigns
and corporations that give rise to these allegations are governed by
contract. These contracts typically include broad arbitration clauses
and waivers of sovereign immunity. Thus, one can anticipate that in
the coming years the focus will be not only on the question of corpo-
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rate liability, but also on the possibilities of contractual arbitration
between the corporation and the sovereign over who should pay for
the human rights liability. This possibility of arbitrating the question
of who pays properly limits the exposure of corporations to third-party
claims. It also has the potential of offering a rare and meaningful tool
to indirectly hold the sovereign accountable for its part in the human
rights abuse. Part IV addresses the developing trend of including
human rights obligations in international agreements. By including
human rights as a substantive contractual obligation and arbitration as
a procedural guarantee, corporations can establish a firm basis for
contractual enforcement of human rights. Finally, Part V considers
the possibility of incorporating third-party beneficiary rights in inter-
national agreements as a means to empower a narrow set of noncon-
tracting parties to challenge human rights violations through an
effective dispute resolution procedure. Corporations can create third-
party beneficiary rights by contract analogous to the third-party bene-
ficiary rights they enjoy under bilateral investment treaties. These cor-
porations thereby can incorporate a mechanism for those third
parties to initiate an effective dispute resolution process to address
core human rights concerns.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR HuMAN RIGHTS ABUSE
If human rights victims had their way, a viable judicial mechanism
in which sovereigns could genuinely be held accountable would
already exist. Sovereign accountability might be pursued through liti-
gation in domestic or foreign courts, or before international tribunals.
But for victims in many countries, domestic litigation against the sov-
ereign for human rights offenses is simply not available. And absent a
treaty expressly providing a mechanism for resolving human rights
claims before international tribunals, they have no opportunity to pur-
sue claims in international human rights tribunals. The result is that
many claims for human rights abuses have been pursued in foreign
courts, particularly in countries that are more amenable to such
claims.
For good or for ill, the United States has become the preferred
venue for pursuing international human rights claims. 4 The reasons
for this are legion, but they include liberal pretrial discovery; broad
rules on personal jurisdiction, including "tag" and "doing business"
jurisdiction; jury trials in civil litigation; higher damage awards,
4 See Aric K. Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum Non Con-
veniens in Human Rights Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. J. I, r'L L. & POL. 1001, 1001, 1023-24
(2001).
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including punitive damages; class action litigation; contingent fee
arrangements with counsel; the absence of "loser pay" rules for the
unsuccessful party; and statutory protections for international law vio-
lations. As a result of these systemic advantages, victims of human
rights abuses have pursued and occasionally succeeded in claims
against individuals responsible for grave human rights violations. 5
While the percentage of successful claims is quite small, the opportu-
nity to pursue human rights claims against individual perpetrators
such as Am~rico Pefia 6 and Radovan Karad~iU has led to a cottage
industry of international human rights litigation in the United States.
But for all these systemic advantages, perpetrator responsibility
remains elusive. One of the principal problems with litigation against
individual perpetrators is that, with very rare exception, 8 these low-
level offenders are not subject to personal jurisdiction and are gener-
ally judgment proof. So another common approach that has been
employed is for human rights victims to pursue claims directly against
sovereign entities. But when human rights victims have pursued
claims against sovereigns, they have been met with formidable
defenses, not the least of which is the claim of sovereign immunity.9
Under well-developed United States law, sovereigns typically
enjoy foreign sovereign immunity for their sovereign acts,' 0 unless
their conduct falls within a narrow set of exceptions outlined in the
5 See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Abebe-Jira v.
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (1lth Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadfii, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995);
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994);
In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir.
1989); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Filartiga, 630
F.2d 876; Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); see also Sandra
Coliver et al., Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable by Using International Law in
U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 169,
173 (2005) (discussing successful suits).
6 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
7 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232.
8 SeeJean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 783 (11th Cir. 2005) (enteringjudgment for
damages against a convicted human rights offender who won the Florida lottery);
Posting of Roger Alford to Opinio Juris, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1133793
000.shtml (Dec. 5, 2005, 09:30) (discussing Dorelien).
9 See K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and Structural Reasonableness, 40 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 1, 2-3 (2004) (explaining the difficulties human rights plaintiffs face).
10 See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135-37
(1812) (recognizing the immunity of a foreign sovereign as being a necessary incident
of the sovereign's "exclusive and absolute" jurisdiction within its borders and waivable
only by "consent of the nation itself").
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Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).1 1 Unremarkably, those
exceptions are unhelpful to human rights victims, as they were not
designed with human rights offenses in mind. In order to pursue a
claim against a sovereign, one must establish that the sovereign com-
mitted acts which justify the removal of immunity, such as engaging in
commercial activity, waiving immunity, expropriating property, or
committing a noncommercial tort within the United States. 12 Propo-
nents have tried to fit the square peg of human rights claims into the
round holes of the FSIA exceptions, but with very limited success.' 3
Such litigation has led to convoluted arguments, such as contentions
that the commission of torture is a commercial activity,' 4 or that
offenses occurring inside an American foreign embassy are torts com-
mitted within the United States,' 5 or that the commission of serious
human rights offenses constitutes an implied waiver of immunity.' 6
Unable to fit human rights claims under the existing FSIA excep-
tions, proponents also have made numerous attempts to amend the
FSIA to include a human rights exception. 17 Not surprisingly, those
attempts have uniformly failed. The concern, of course, is if the
11 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007); see also Beth Stephens,
Conceptualizing Violence Under International Criminal Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?,
60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 598 (1997) (explaining that human rights "[]itigation ... has
not been successful against sovereign states, which are protected from suits in U.S.
courts by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), unless the claim falls within
one of the enumerated exceptions to immunity," and these "do not include a general
authorization for claims of gross human rights abuses").
12 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2000). The only exception that clearly applies to human
rights claims involves those limited cases pertaining to state-sponsored terrorism. See,
e.g., Simpson v. Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahiriya, 470 F.3d 356, 359 (D.C. Cir.
2006); Kilburn v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1126-27
(D.C. Cir. 2004); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (D.D.C.
1998).
13 See Boyd, supra note 9, at 27-28; Paul R. Dubinsky, Justice for the Collective: The
Limits of the Human Rights Class Action, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1152, 1168-69 (2004); Ste-
phens, supra note 11, at 598.
14 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 354 (1993); Garb v. Republic of Poland,
440 F.3d 579, 582 (2d Cir. 2006).
15 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
16 See Sampson v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1150-51 (7th Cir.
2001); Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 244-45 (2d
Cir. 1996); Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1992).
17 See David J. Bederman, Dead Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Immunities in U.S.
Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. Ir'rr'L & COMP. L. 255, 282-84 (1996); Elizabeth F.
Defeis, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Human Rights Violations, 8 ILSA J.
IN'T'L & COMP. L. 363, 370-71 (2002); Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of
Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 27 (1996).
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United States were to opt for such an exception for grave human
rights violations, other countries might reciprocate, opening the door
for national courts to be the final arbiter of the global conduct of
other nations, including our own. Such reciprocity concerns do not
suggest that the United States fears accountability for human rights
violations, but rather that it fears the demise of foreign sovereign
immunity's traditional distinction between immunity for public acts
and accountability for private or commercial acts. An exception for
human rights violations would reflect a dramatic normative shift away
from traditional understandings of immunity for public acts, a shift
arguably no less significant than the move from absolute to restrictive
immunity.18 As Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco put it:
[T]he case against further congressional encroachments on sover-
eign immunity is compelling. By weakening its sovereign-immunity
laws, the United States may put its own assets and interests abroad at
risk. After all, sovereign immunity is meant to be a reciprocal
arrangement. With its worldwide reach, the United States would be
particularly vulnerable should other countries imitate Congress and
permit suits against the U.S. government abroad.19
A human rights exception to the FSIA would shift the focus in
addressing human rights abuses away from the executive branch and
toward the judicial branch, something the United States consistently
resists in the various statements of interest that it has filed opposing
human rights litigation that casts judgment on a foreign sovereign's
conduct abroad.20
II. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
As human rights claims against sovereigns generally have proved
unavailing, the issue of corporate liability under international law has
become increasingly important. The viability of such claims is uncer-
18 For a thoughtful examination of the potential for such a doctrinal shift, see
Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Norma-
tive Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 741, 765-80 (2003).
19 Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 2, at 113.
20 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en
banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345,
351 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co. KG, 431 F.3d 57, 59 (2d
Cir. 2005); Mujica v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1194 (C.D. Cal.
2005); see also David P. Stewart, Immunity and Accountability: More Continuity than
Change?, 99 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 227, 230 (2005) (pointing out that there are
already exceptions to the FSIA for expropriation and terrorism).
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tain,21 but the prospect of pursuing international law claims against
wealthy corporate wrongdoers has whet the appetite for a new and
effective form of litigation. While the law is in a state of flux, it is
subject to pressures to broaden the scope of the claims and the iden-
tity of the defendants to include corporate actors.
Classic understandings of international law suggest that only
states enjoy legal personality under international law. Oppenheim's
International Law articulated the classic formulation as follows:
States are the principal subjects of international law. This means
that international law is primarily a law for the international con-
duct of States, and not of their citizens. As a rule, the subjects of the
rights and duties arising from international law are States solely and
exclusively, and international law does not normally impose duties
or confer rights directly upon an individual human being.
22
From this general proposition is the corollary principle that corpora-
tions do not have rights and responsibilities under international law.
A generation ago one could say that prima facie it would be "absurd to
accord any public international law status to a private corporation. '" 23
The traditional argument, recently expressed by Christopher Green-
wood, is that "there is no basis in existing international law for the
liability of corporations and, consequently, no rules of international
law regarding the questions which necessarily arise when a corpora-
tion is accused of wrongdoing."24 Likewise, Professor James Crawford
put it succinctly: "Except where international law creates direct
responsibility for specific acts, as it does for specified international
crimes, it does not have its own system of responsibility for breaches of
international law on the part of persons generally, still less its own
21 For various views on the topic of corporate liability for human tights abuses,
see generally HuMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999); NicoLA M.C.P. JAGERS, CORPORATE
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS (2002); Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibili-
ties of Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 153 (1997); William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theoy Versus
Quantitative Analysis, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 368, 374-79 (1996).
22 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992).
23 W. Friedmann, General Course in Public International Law, 127 RECUEIL DES
CouRs 39, 121 (1969).
24 Declaration of Christopher Greenwood at 8, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 01 CV 9882 (AGS)),
available at http://www.opiniojuris.org/files/GreenwoodDeclaration.pdf.
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system of corporate responsibility." 25 And United Nations Special
Representative John Ruggie recently has stated that recent efforts "to
take existing State-based human rights instruments and simply assert
that many of their provisions are binding on corporations" has "little
authoritative basis in international law-hard, soft, or otherwise." 26
Today, however, there is little doubt that movement is afoot to
modify this classic Westphalian understanding of international law.
Judge Thomas Buergenthal has argued that
[w]hen we compare the position of individuals under interna-
tional law as it existed before the Second World War with their sta-
tus under contemporary international law, it is evident that a
dramatic legal and conceptual transformation has taken place. This
transformation has "internationalized human rights and humanized
international law." . . . Due to the humanization of international
law, individuals as such now have internationally guaranteed human
rights, and to that extent are subjects of international law.2 7
But despite the extension of international recognition to individuals,
the precise role of corporations under international law remains elu-
sive. Civil society is increasingly focusing on the role of corporations
in promoting human rights. Addressing the role of businesses as
social actors, over two hundred NGOs recently argued that "[a]n
important role of international human rights law is to limit and gov-
ern the exercise of power. International human rights law must con-
tinue to develop to account for the growing power of actors other
than states to affect individuals', communities' and peoples' enjoy-
ment of their human rights. ' 28 Given that corporations have rights
and duties under all domestic legal systems, the question is whether
such artificial persons may have international responsibility. 29
Scholars are filling the gap with arguments for extending interna-
tional personality to corporations. For example, in one recent note-
worthy article, Steven Ratner has argued for a theory of corporate
25 Declaration ofJames Crawford at 12, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 374 F. Supp.
2d 331, (No. 01 CV 9882 (AGS)), available at http://www.opiniojuris.org/files/Craw-
fordDeclaration.pdf.
26 Ruggie Interim Report, supra note 3, 60, at 15.
27 Thomas Buergenthal, International Law and the Holocaust, in HOLOCAUST RESTI-
TUTION 17, 21 (MichaelJ. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2006) (footnotes omitted).
28 Letter from Action for Social Rights et al. to Professor John Ruggie, Special
Representative on Human Rights and Transnational Corps. and Other Bus. Enters.,
Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights 4 (Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://
www.escr-net.org/usr doc/OpenLetterRuggieFinalEndorsements.pdf.
29 IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, CORPORATIONS IN AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
1 (1987).
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responsibility under international law.30 While corporations have
rights under international law, such as economic rights under invest-
ment treaties, he concedes that governments appear to remain
"ambivalent about accepting corporate duties, [particularly] duties
that corporations might have toward individuals. '" 31 Ratner argues
that international law must move beyond its current stage and pre-
scribe law in this area in a coherent fashion through a theory of cor-
porate responsibility for human rights under international law. 32 His
strongest argument rests on a theory of corporate responsibility based
on an entity's ties to the government.3 3 He argues that corporate
duties to "protect human rights increase as a function of its ties to the
government. If the corporation ... knowingly and substantially aids
and abets governmental abuses, carries out governmental functions
and causes abuses, or. .. allows governmental actors to commit them,
its responsibility flows from that of the state. '34
This is precisely the direction that litigation in the United States
has taken shape, where claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 35
have proven fertile ground for testing the possibility of corporate
responsibility under international law. In the landmark case of Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain3 6 the Supreme Court addressed the legitimacy of
claims for certain human rights violations under the ATS. The Court
recognized that certain causes of action were cognizable under mod-
ern international law provided that "any claim based on the present-
day law of nations" will "rest on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity compara-
ble to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recog-
nized. 137 While Sosa resolved the question of the continued viability
of a certain category of human rights claims under the ATS, it did not
resolve whether private actors such as corporations can be subject to
such suits. The Court noted that the appellate courts are split on the
question of whether "international law extends the scope of liability
30 See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsi-
bility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001). For a brief contrary perspective on corporate aiding
and abetting liability, see Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law,
and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 924-29 (2007).
31 See Ratner, supra note 30, at 488.
32 See id.
33 See id. at 497-506.
34 Id. at 524.
35 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
36 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
37 Id. at 725.
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for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual."3 8
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, lower courts have
addressed numerous ATS claims against corporations, but surprisingly
few have squarely addressed the question of whether corporations
may be liable under international law.3 9 Those courts that do address
the question are split as to whether international law recognizes cor-
porate liability for human rights abuses. For example, Judge Wein-
stein in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation4 ° conceded that
there is "substantial support" for the position that corporations can-
not be liable under international law, 41 but concluded that "[1] imiting
civil liability to individuals while exonerating the corporation
directing the individual's action . . . makes little sense in today's
world.... A corporation is not immune from civil legal action based
on international law."42 By contrast, in Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,43
Judge Oberdorfer stated that grafting "color of law analysis onto inter-
national law claims would be an end-run around the accepted princi-
ple that most violations of international law can be committed only by
states .... Indeed, the Supreme Court [in Sosa] suggested that only
states, and not corporations or individuals, may be liable for interna-
tional law violations." 44
38 Id. at 732 n.20. For a more detailed and critical analysis of corporate liability
under and in light of Sosa, see Bradley et al., supra note 30, at 924-29.
39 Most courts simply pass over the question with superficial analysis, see, e.g.,
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007) (passing over the ques-
tion of corporate liability), reh 'g en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007), or con-
clude that Sosa does not alter previous holdings that corporations may be liable under
international law, see Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2007 WL 2349341,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (refusing to extend Sosa to corporations); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(same).
40 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
41 Id. at 54.
42 Id. at 58; see Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1241 & n.17; Bowoto, 2007 WL 2349341, at *6;
Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 284-85 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 335; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., No. 96 CIV.
8386(KMW), 2002 WL 319887, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
43 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005).
44 Id. at 26; see also Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57-58 (D.D.C. 2006)
(rejecting arguments of actionable claims under the ATS of plaintiff allegations of
torture by private parties who were civilian employees of American corporations
doing contract work for the U.S. military); Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d
1019, 1026 (W.D. Wash. 2005) ("[T]he Ninth Circuit has held that '[o]nly individuals
who have acted under official authority or under color of such authority may violate
international law."' (quoting In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1992))); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d
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In one of the more significant examples of confusion in the
courts, the Second Circuit recently held that "a plaintiff may plead a
theory of aiding and abetting liability" to hold defendants liable under
international law.45 A two-judge majority of the court further held
that the standard for aiding and abetting under the Alien Tort Statute
was the international law standard applied by the International Crimi-
nal Court under the Rome Statute. 46 But then those two judges could
not agree as to whether that standard should apply to corporations,
leaving the lower court with a standard to apply but no clarity as to
which defendants to apply it to.
47
Notwithstanding these conflicting voices, one can anticipate that
plaintiffs will continue to pursue claims in those jurisdictions that
have upheld corporate liability for human rights violations under
international law.48 Indeed, the clear trend is to pursue international
human rights claims against corporations. According to business
groups who follow such litigation, over seventy-five percent of the
claims filed under the ATS and/or the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA) 49 involve defendant corporations. 50 Many of these corpora-
tions are household names, such as Coca-Cola, Nestle, Pfizer, Daimler-
Chrysler, Del Monte, Dow, Levi Strauss, Target, and Mitsubishi. Busi-
ness groups have expressed concern that "[f]oreign plaintiffs are
increasingly invoking U.S. laws such as the.. .Alien Tort Statute... to
file lawsuits in U.S. courts. These foreign plaintiffs ... use American
courts to seek money extraction from international companies that
operate in their homeland."51 Recent business commentators have
10, 13-15 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that torture by private government contractors is
not actionable as a violation of the law of nations).
45 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007)
(addressing claims against corporations for allegedly aiding and abetting human
rights abuses arising out of South African apartheid).
46 See id. at 275 (Katzmann, J., concurring); id. at 332 (Korman, J., concurring
and dissenting).
47 Id. at 330-33 (Korman, J., concurring and dissenting).
48 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (citing cases); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455752,
at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (citing pre- and post-Sosa cases holding corporations
liable).
49 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000).
50 The Institute for Legal Reform, Global Forum Shopping Cases (Jan. 31, 2007) (on
file with author). This report reveals that of the sixty cases that recently have been
filed under the ATS and TVPA, only fourteen did not involve a defendant corpora-
tion. Id.
51 Institute for Legal Reform, Issues Research Center: Global Forum Shopping,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/issuedetail.cfm?issue=GFS (last vis-
itedJan. 14, 2008).
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argued that the "typical" ATS case is now one in which plaintiffs "con-
tend that corporate defendants ... have either violated international
law, or have become legally responsible for the conduct or policies of
foreign regimes."5 2
The purpose of this Article is not to affirm or disaffirm this trend
of holding corporations liable under international law. Rather its pur-
pose is to recognize an observable trend in human rights litigation
patterns and consider its ramifications. If corporations increasingly
are subject to international responsibility, then this portends new ave-
nues for holding sovereigns responsible for their share of the liability.
If it is true that in many cases "plaintiffs are us [ing] corporations as
proxies for what are essentially attacks on government action," 53 then
plaintiffs are targeting the wrong (or at least less culpable) party. But
if such proxy litigation is targeting the wrong party, then that party
can and should take action against the more culpable sovereign actor.
One viable mechanism to do this is through contractual arbitration
against the sovereign.
III. ARBITRATING WHO PAYS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE
If the premise is correct that corporations will increasingly be
held liable for international human rights violations, what are the
implications of this development? Thus far the scholarship and juris-
prudence have only focused on the relationship between the human
rights victim and the corporate malfeasor. But a logical extension of
this development is to explore the potential horizontal relationship
between the corporation and the sovereign for their joint action in
violating international law. If it is increasingly accurate to say that cor-
porations are liable under international law if they aid and abet gov-
ernmental abuses, then what recourse does the corporation have
against the sovereign joint malfeasor? Corporations have legitimate
concerns that they are being unfairly targeted because they are more
vulnerable to suit, particularly vis-d-vis their sovereign partners. And
they fear that corporate defendants will find it difficult or impossible
to join other parties potentially responsible for alleged wrongdoing as
a result of sovereign immunity.54
This Article suggests that the solution to this problem can be
found in contract and arbitration law. If a corporation is engaging in
52 JOHN H. BEISNER & JOHN F. NIBLOCK, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
THE TEEMING SHORE 15 (2004), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
issues/docload.cfm?docid-751.
53 Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 2, at 107.
54 See BEISNER & NIBLOCK, supra note 52, at 17.
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joint action with government actors, then almost by definition the par-
ties are acting pursuant to some contractual relationship. A brief
perusal of the human rights claims that have been filed against corpo-
rations shows that they almost always are premised on some contrac-
tual agreement between the corporation and the sovereign. Pfizer
allegedly contracts with the Nigerian government for the testing of
experimental drugs on unsuspecting Nigerians. 55 Unocal and Burma
are in a joint venture for the construction of a pipeline that allegedly
resulted in displacement of villages and the use of forced labor.5 6
Titan contracts with the United States for the detention and interroga-
tion of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad.5 7 Exxon
Mobil is allegedly jointly and severally liable for human rights abuses
allegedly committed by the Indonesian military assigned to protect gas
production facilities in northern Sumatra. 58 The Colombian Air
Force is alleged to have bombed Santo Domingo, Colombia, killing
numerous villagers, in order to protect Occidental's pipeline. 59 Talis-
man Energy allegedly aided and abetted the ethnic cleansing of Chris-
tians by Islamic forces in Sudan by building roads and airports.60 Dow
Chemical manufactured and sold the herbicide "Agent Orange" to
the United States government for use in the Vietnam War. 61 Texaco
and Ecuador have a joint venture for the extraction of oil that alleg-
edly leads to environmental damage in the Ecuadorian Amazon. 62 In
these and similar cases, plaintiffs allege that international law viola-
tions resulted from joint action between the corporation and the sov-
ereign pursuant to a contractual relationship.
If this is so, then the contract between the corporation and the
sovereign may well govern the question of shared responsibility for
third-party harms. The contractual relationship between the corpora-
tion and the sovereign is a significant component in human rights
litigation, far more relevant than is currently reflected in academic
commentary. A foreign investment agreement (or similar agreement)
55 See Adamu v. Pfizer, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 495, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Abdul-
lahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 CIV. 8118, 2002 WL 31082956, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
2002), vacated in part, 77 F. App'x 48 (2d Cir. 2003).
56 See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936-40 (9th Cir. 2002).
57 See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55;'55 (D.D.C. 2006); Ibrahim v. Titan
Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12-13 (D.D.C. 2005).
58 Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2005).
59 Mujica v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138-39 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
60 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
296-302 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
61 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
62 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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between a corporation and a sovereign typically will include provisions
addressing performance obligations, conditions, representations and
warranties, affirmative and negative covenants, governing law, indem-
nifications, waiver of sovereign immunity, and provisions for arbitra-
tion. 63 Of these provisions, two are of particular importance to
human rights claims: waiver of sovereign immunity and arbitration
clauses.
A contractual provision in which the sovereign entity waives
immunity is quite common in foreign investment agreements, as it is
the most effective way to place a sovereign party on an equal footing
with the private party.64 A typical waiver of sovereign immunity clause
provides that
the sovereign entity hereby irrevocably waives any claim to immu-
nity in regard to any proceedings to enforce any arbitral award ren-
dered by a tribunal constituted pursuant to this Agreement,
including without limitation, immunity from service of process,
immunity from jurisdiction of any court, and immunity of any of its
property from execution. 65
Such an explicit waiver of immunity overcomes the traditional con-
cerns of securing government accountability for noncompliance with
contractual obligations. A broadly worded clause stipulating that the
sovereign waives immunity for service of process, jurisdiction, enforce-
ment, and execution is designed so that the sovereign will have no
claim to immunity with respect to any aspect of a legal dispute with
63 See, e.g., CTR. FOR INT'L LEGAL STUDIES, SALZBURG, AUSTRIA, COMMERCIAL ALLI-
ANCES IN THE INFORMATION AGE 154-55 (Dennis Campbell & Susan Cotter eds., 1996);
JAN PAULSSON ET AL., THE FRESHFIELDS GUIDE To ARBITRATION AND ADR 11-24, 95-105
(2d rev. ed. 1999).
64 PAULSSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 83.
65 Id. at 84; see also Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 243
(2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the agreement with the sovereign provided that "[t] o the
extent that [the Congo] may in any jurisdiction claim for itself or its assets immunity
from suit, execution, attachment (whether in aid of execution, before judgment or
otherwise) or other legal process... [the Congo] agrees not to claim and waives such
immunity to the full extent permitted by the laws of that jurisdiction intending, in
particular, that in any proceedings taken in New York the foregoing waiver of immu-
nity shall have effect under and be construed in accordance with the United States
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976"); ICSID MODEL CLAUSES cl. 15 (Int'l Ctr.
for Settlement of Inv. Disputes 1993), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
StaticFiles/model-clauses-en/15.htm ("The Host State hereby waives any right of sov-
ereign immunity as to it and its property in respect of the enforcement and execution
of any award rendered by an Arbitral Tribunal constituted pursuant to this
agreement.").
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the corporation, including the filing of noncontractual tort claims. 66
Significantly, the FSIA includes a specific exception for express waiv-
ers,67 overcoming concerns of sovereign immunity in these contexts.
Likewise, an arbitration clause in an international agreement
with a sovereign is an extraordinarily common vehicle to secure
accountability for sovereign breaches or other illegal conduct arising
out of or relating to the agreement. As with express waivers, the FSIA
includes an exception to immunity for international agreements that
include an arbitration clause and are subject to international treaty
enforcement under the New York Convention. 68 Thus, with or with-
out an express waiver of immunity, by agreeing to international arbi-
tration pursuant to the New York Convention, a sovereign has waived
immunity under the arbitration exception of the FSIA.
A typical arbitration clause provides that
any, dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or in connection
with this contract, including any question regarding its existence,
validity, or termination, shall be finally resolved by arbitration
under the Rules of [name of institution] in force at [the date
66 See, e.g., Gulf Res. Am., Inc. v. Republic of the Congo, 370 F.3d 65, 72-73 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (interpreting breach of contract and tort claims as waived by virtue of a
waiver clause); cf. World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d
1154, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that narrowly worded waiver of immunity
clauses in two of four contracts permitted a claim of waiver for some, but not all,
claims against the sovereign).
67 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2000) (stating that "[a] foreign state shall not be
immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any
case . . . in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by
implication").
68 See id. § 1605(a)(6) (providing that "[a] foreign state shall not be immune
from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in
which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign state
with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences
which have arisen or which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award
made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration takes place or
is intended to take place in the United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may
be governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United
States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, (C) the underly-
ing claim, save for the agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in a United
States court under this section or section 1607, or (D) paragraph (1) of this subsec-
tion is otherwise applicable"). The most common international treaty to enforce for-
eign arbitration agreements and awards is the New York Convention. Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
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hereof/the date of the request for arbitration], which Rules are
deemed to be incorporated by reference into this clause.6 9
The key point of these arbitration clauses is the scope of the clause.
Using broad and inclusive terms in delineating jurisdictional authority
will grant the arbitration tribunal authority over any dispute that
broadly relates to the contract, including contractual claims, tort
claims, and statutory claims.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 70 the Supreme Court has
articulated an extremely liberal approach to interpreting the scope of
arbitration clauses, requiring any doubt as to the scope of the clause
to be construed in favor of arbitration. 71 For example, courts have
construed broad arbitration clauses to require arbitration of such mat-
ters as workplace discrimination claims,72 intentional torts,73 invasion
of privacy and harassment,74 patent infringement, 75 tortious destruc-
tion of property from inadvertent missile launches, 76 and contribution
claims by one joint tortfeasor against another.7 7 Such matters are
properly within the scope of a broad arbitration clause because they
"relate to," "arise from," or are "connected with" the contract.78
69 See PAULSSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 96; see also Int'l Trade Ctr., Model Clause:
American Arbitration Association, http://www.jurisint.org/doc/html/cla/en/2005/
2005jiclaen5.html (last visitedJan. 14, 2008) ("Any controversy or claim arising out of
or relating to this contract shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with the
International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association."); Int'l
Chamber of Commerce, ICC Standard and Suggested Clauses for Dispute Resolution
Services, http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4114/index.html (follow
"English" hyperlink under "Arbitration") (last visitedJan. 14, 2008) ("All disputes aris-
ing out of or in connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under the
Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbi-
trators appointed in accordance with the said Rules.").
70 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
71 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 475-76 (1989); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 626 (1985); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1983).
72 SeeGilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991); EEOC
v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 746-54 (9th Cir. 2003).
73 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. of Ala. v. Vintson, 753 So. 2d 497, 504-05 (Ala.
1999).
74 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Shoemaker, 775 So. 2d 149, 151 (Ala. 2000).
75 See Innovative Eng'g Solutions v. Misonix, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1195-96
(D. Or. 2006).
76 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Denmark, 607 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (E.D. Mo.
1985).
77 See Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., 514 F.2d 614, 616 (1st Cir. 1975).
78 See, e.g., CD Partners, LLC v. Grizzle, 424 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 2005) (hold-
ing that an arbitration clause requiring arbitration of "any claim, controversy or dis-
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Particularly relevant are those instances in which courts have
ruled that contribution claims among joint tortfeasors are subject to
arbitration under a broadly worded arbitration clause. For example,
in Acevedo Maldanado v. PPG Industries,79 residents of a Puerto Rico
town brought negligence claims against PPG, the owner of a manufac-
turing plant, for injuries suffered from gas leaks.80 PPG in turn
brought a joint tortfeasor claim for contribution against Fluor, the
designer and constructor of the plant.8 ' Fluor moved for a stay of
litigation pending arbitration.8 2 The First Circuit ruled that the con-
tract provided for arbitration of "any controversy or claim arising out
of or relating to this Agreement" and that such broad language
covers contract-generated or contracted-related disputes between
the parties however labeled: it is immaterial whether claims are in
contract or in tort, or are couched in terms of the contribution
owed by one tortfeasor to another. Fluor's liability, if any, arises
because it was PPG's contractor and designer. Absent the contracts,
there would be no occasion for a third-party claim.8 3
In a similar vein, a broad arbitration clause encompasses claims
for indemnification from third-party liability. Thus, in Ballard v. Illi-
nois Central Railroad Co.,s4 a plaintiff brought a tort claim against a
Canadian company for injuries suffered during a railroad construc-
tion accident.8 5 The Canadian railroad company brought indemnifi-
cation claims against the contractors, and the contractors sought to
pute arising out of or relating to Franchisee's operation of the Franchised business
under the Agreement" was "broadly worded" and has been "generally construed to
cover tort suits arising from the same set of operative facts covered by a contract
between the parties to the agreement"); Drews Distrib., Inc. v. Silicon Gaming, Inc.,
245 F.3d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he arbitration clause ... is a 'broad' one,
covering as it does 'any controversy or claim arising out of or related to' that agree-
ment .... [T]he reach of an arbitration clause is not restricted to those causes of
action brought under the contract containing the clause, unless the parties draft a
clause so restricted in scope." (citations omitted)).
79 514 F.2d 614.
80 Id. at 615.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 616 (citations omitted); see also Walter Oil & Gas Corp. v. Teekay Ship-
ping, 270 F. Supp. 2d 855, 863 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that a vessel owner's contri-
bution and indemnity claim against a vessel charterer was subject to arbitration;
charterer and owner were parties to a contract that included a valid provision to arbi-
trate, and owner's claims for contribution and indemnity came within the provision's
broad scope).
84 338 F. Supp. 2d 712 (S.D. Miss. 2004).
85 Id. at 714.
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compel arbitration.8 6 The court granted the request, ruling that the
third-party indemnification claims "fall under the broad arbitration
provision of the Service Contract" and that "the arbitration provision
is sufficiently broad to indicate that the parties intended to encompass
all aspects of the relationship between them. '87 Likewise, in In re NBR
Antitrust Litigation,88 the plaintiffs brought a class action alleging
unlawful price fixing against one joint venturer, and the defendant
cross-claimed against the other joint venturers seeking indemnifica-
tion. 89 Upon a motion to compel arbitration, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that the claim for indemnification was subject to arbitration
between the joint venturers.90
If contribution and indemnity claims are subject to arbitration in
the domestic context involving international parties, the question
arises whether a similar result should obtain with international agree-
ments involving multinational corporations and sovereigns. With a
waiver of immunity and a commitment to arbitrate, the stage is set for
an effective mechanism to resolve disputes over who pays for human
rights abuses. The critical question is whether a corporation that is
found liable in a domestic court for aiding and abetting human rights
abuses can pursue an action in arbitration against the sovereign for
contribution or indemnification pursuant to the contract. The answer
should be yes.
This question of contribution and indemnification claims against
sovereigns has been addressed in the domestic context under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA).91 Where the sovereign has immunity
against the injured party but not against a joint tortfeasor, the
Supreme Court has held that "[t]he Federal Tort Claims Act permits
an indemnity action against the United States 'in the same manner
and to the same extent' that the action would lie against 'a private
individual under like circumstances. "92 Applying that standard, the
86 See id.
87 Id. at 715-16.
88 207 F. App'x 166 (3d Cir. 2006).
89 See id. at 168.
90 See id. at 171-72; see also Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Constr., Inc.,
882 A.2d 288, 295-96 (Md. 2005) (holding that claims for indemnification or contri-
bution are subject to arbitration where subcontractor and contractor have an arbitra-
tion agreement).
91 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
92 Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 198 (1983) (quoting
§ 2674). In Lockheed, aircraft operated by the United States Air Force and manufac-
tured by Lockheed crashed in Vietnam. Id. at 191. The United States paid death
benefits to the deceased's survivors and thereby was immune from suit by the injured
party under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. Id. at 193-94. Plaintiffs sued
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Court ruled that despite the inability of the deceased's survivors to
pursue an action against the United States, there was no impediment
to a third-party claim by the corporation against the United States for
indemnification for damages paid by the corporation to the
deceased's survivors. 93 The Court has held the same rule applies
under the FTCA for claims of contribution by ajoint tortfeasor against
the United States. 94 The Court held that this is true even if two modes
of adjudication-such as one jury trial and one bench trial-were
required. 9 5
These holdings are of great significance for claims against foreign
sovereigns under the FSIA because the language in the FT CA that
gives rise to these conclusions is identical to the language in § 1606 of
the FSIA. Both the FTCA and the FSIA provide that for claims in
which the sovereign is not entitled to immunity, the sovereign "shall
be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances." 96 Thus, if a sovereign is not entitled
to immunity under either the FTCA or the FSIA, it should be subject
to indemnification and contribution claims in the same manner as a
private party. In the absence of immunity, as with private parties, con-
tribution and indemnity claims will be subject to arbitration pursuant
Lockheed and Lockheed sought indemnification against the United States pursuant
to the Federal Tort Claims Act. See id. at 191-98; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2674 ("The
United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort
claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances . . .).
93 See Lockheed, 460 U.S. at 199.
94 See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1951); see also Lopez
v. A.C. & S., Inc., 858 F.2d 712, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Since United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., it has been settled that in a private tort case, a person may bring in the United
States as third-party defendant for indemnity or contribution if the United States was
wholly or in part at fault." (citation omitted)).
95 In Yellow Cab, the Court held that if a jury is demanded, and separation of
claims against the government tortfeasor and the corporate tortfeasor is required,
then a court can order separate trials. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. at 555-56 ("The possibility
of such procedural difficulties is not sufficient ground for so limiting the scope of the
[FTCA] as to preclude its application to all cases of contribution or even to all cases of
contribution arising under third-party practice."); David A. Bagley, The United States
and International Nuclear Civil Liability, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 497, 573 n.322 (1992).
96 Compare Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2000) ("As to
any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity
under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances . . . ."), with Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000) ("The United
States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title r lating to tort claims, in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances .... ").
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to international agreements between the corporation and the
sovereign.
This principle is finding practical application in the current dis-
pute that is unfolding between ChevronTexaco and the government
of Ecuador over environmental damage caused in the Ecuadorian
Amazon. In 1993 a private lawsuit was filed in New York alleging that
ChevronTexaco polluted the rain forests and rivers of Ecuador in vio-
lation of various laws, including the Alien Tort Statute.97 This lawsuit
was dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds and a private lawsuit
was subsequently brought in Ecuador alleging similar environmental
damage. 98 Following the initiation of this lawsuit in Ecuador, in 2004
ChevronTexaco filed an arbitration claim before the American Arbi-
tration Association (AAA) against the Ecuadorian oil company
Petroecuador alleging a contractual right to indemnification for the
total value of their costs, fees, and any adverse judgment rendered in
the Ecuadorian lawsuit.99
The contractual history of the parties is quite complex, raising
doubts as to whether ChevronTexaco could arbitrate its indemnifica-
tion claims against Ecuador and Petroecuador. 0 0 Essentially, the
1965 joint operating agreement signed between a subsidiary, Texaco
Petroleum, and a state-owned Ecuadorian oil company included a
provision indemnifying Texaco from "'all claims and demands which
may be made against Operator [Texaco] by third parties due to, aris-
ing out of, or related to the performance by the Operator [Texaco] of
its duties under this Agreement."1 01 The arbitration clause in the
agreement provided that "' [a] ny controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this contract or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbi-
97 See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002).
98 See Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334, 341-42
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
99 Id. In the 1990s, while the federal lawsuit was ongoing, Texaco signed various
agreements with Ecuador and state-owned Petroecuador in which Texaco agreed to
undertake environmental remediation in exchange for a release of claims by Ecuador
and Petroecuador. Id. In 2001 the Aguinda lawsuit was dismissed on forum non con-
veniens grounds, and the plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against Texaco in Ecuado-
rian courts in Lago Agria. Id. ChevronTexaco alleged that this Ecuadorian lawsuit
was filed pursuant to Ecuadorian environmental laws that allow plaintiffs to assert
public rights by acting as "private attorneys general" in violation of the various
releases and indemnifications. See id.; Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534,
537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
100 The contractual history of the parties is discussed at length in Republic of Ecua-
dor, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 338-42.
101 Id. at 338-39 (quoting the joint operating agreement).
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tration in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American
Arbitration Association."' 102
After ChevronTexaco filed for arbitration, Ecuador and
Petroecuador moved to stay the arbitration. I 03 In June 2007, the
court ruled that the 1965 joint operating agreement was not signed by
Ecuador or Petroecuador and that they were not bound as nonsig-
natories by operation of law. 10 4 Accordingly, the court held that arbi-
tration against Ecuador and Petroecuador was not an available
remedy pursuant to the arbitration clause in the 1965 joint operating
agreement.l05
Regardless of the court's contractual ruling in Republic of Ecuador
v. Chevron Texaco Corp., the broader implications of the case are clear.
The case illustrates the direct connection between domestic litigation
against corporations alleging international law violations and arbitra-
tion proceedings between the corporation and the sovereign over the
responsibility to pay for any adverse judgment.
The ramifications for international human rights litigation are
profound. To the extent that corporations are increasingly subject to
third-party claims for human rights violations arising out of or related
to a contract with a sovereign, one can anticipate that in the future
corporations will seek to shield themselves from this third-party risk by
invoking the arbitration clause in the contract against the sovereign.
In short, human rights litigation will lead to "who pays" arbitration.
This is not to suggest that the question of who pays is an easy one.
Numerous factors will play into resolution of it, including legal ques-
tions such as interpreting contractual language, applying the gov-
erning law, and discerning international law principles of joint
liability, contribution, and indemnification.10 6 Factual questions will
102 Demand for Arbitration and Statement of Claim at 4, ChevronTexaco Corp. v.
Empresa Estatal Petroleos del Ecuador (quoting the joint operating agreement),
available at http://www.opiniojuris.org/files/ChevronTexacoArbitrationRequest.
pdf.
103 See Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 499 F. Supp. 2d 452, 457
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
104 Id. at 458-69.
105 See id. at 469.
106 On the subject of international law principles of contribution, see Int'l Law
Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-Third Session, art. 39, at 275,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10(SUPP) (Oct. 1, 2001) ("In the determination of reparation,
account shall be taken of the contribution to the injury by wilful or negligent action
or omission of the injured State or any person or entity in relation to whom repara-
tion is sought."), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
NO1/557/81/img/NO155781.pdPOpenElement. The commentary to Article 39
states that "Article 39 deals with the situation where damage has been caused by an
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also be critical, such as issues ofjoint liability and relative fault. But to
recognize the difficulties in application is not to reject the validity of a
theory of joint contribution or contractual indemnification in the
international context.
The impact of this approach is twofold. First, it properly limits
the exposure of the corporation. This limit may be total (as with an
indemnification clause) or partial, as where the corporation pursues a
contribution claim against the sovereign. This is wholly appropriate,
because in the case of indemnification claims, the corporation should
be able to invoke the benefit of the bargain it secured in the contract
with the sovereign to limit its exposure to the third-party claims. And
in the case of contribution claims, the corporation arguably should
not be the sole malfeasor that is potentially liable for injuries that it
may have only partially caused. Arbitrating the question of who pays
closes the loop in those cases that essentially are proxy claims that
would have been brought against the sovereign if they could.
The second impact is on the liability of the sovereign. Human
rights litigation followed by "who pays" arbitration is a two-step pro-
cess that overcomes the traditional immunity that sovereigns enjoy in
human rights litigation. Thus far, human rights litigants have
attempted to scale an impregnable wall of sovereign immunity by rely-
ing on awkward FSLA tools such as commercial activity or implied
waivers. 10 7 But corporations have no such difficulties. They can
invoke provisions in their contracts that were specifically drafted to
fulfill the relatively straightforward FSIA exceptions of express waiver
and arbitration. 08 Corporations typically cannot implead and cross-
claim against the sovereign in the underlying litigation. But they can
do the next best thing by arbitrating the question of who pays for the
human rights abuses. Effectively, the arbitration procedure operates
as a second-tier cross-claim by one malfeasor against the other.
What is particularly important about this paradigm shift is that
heretofore human rights abuse has been a relatively cost-free enter-
internationally wrongful act of a State, which is accordingly responsible for the dam-
age .... Its focus is on situations which in national law systems are referred to as
'contributory negligence', 'comparative fault', 'faute de la victime', etc." Id. As for
international law principles of indemnification, see LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001
I.C.J. 466, 487, 508 (June 27) (indicating that an injured state's delay in asserting
breach and instituting proceedings could be a factor in determining remedies against
a breaching state).
107 See supra Part I.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1), (6)
(2000) ("A foreign state shall not be immune ... in any case... in which the foreign
state has waived its immunity ... [or] in which the action is brought ... to enforce an
agreement ... to submit to arbitration .... ").
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prise for perpetrators, particularly sovereigns. Or at a minimum, one
could say that certain sovereigns have calculated that the benefits of
abuse often outweigh the costs. But with corporate liability that equa-
tion changes dramatically. To use Guido Calabresi's scheme of cost
avoidance, monetary incentives are placed on corporations to change
their conduct so as to reduce the number and severity of human
rights violations.10 9 But corporations may not be in the best position
to modify their conduct so as to prevent these injuries from occurring
in the future. It may be that sovereigns can best avoid certain injuries,
despite the fact that they are relieved of the direct costs of liability for
those injuries. By assigning the costs to the corporation, it is in a posi-
tion to induce the sovereign to change its behavior. 110 And by impos-
ing a cost on corporations that aid and abet sovereign abuse, those
corporations will become cost avoiders. One logical way to avoid costs
is to transfer some of the costs to the cheapest cost avoider, thereby
enhancing the likelihood that the sovereign will decide against
inflicting future injury. Holding corporations liable and then arbitrat-
ing who pays is a mechanism of imposing costs and then spreading the
costs, resulting in the corporation and the sovereign becoming cost
avoiders. By imposing and spreading costs to the secondary and pri-
mary perpetrators, greater fairness between the malfeasors is achieved
and deterrence from human rights abuse is enhanced. Contractual
arbitration between the corporation and the sovereign over who pays
transfers costs imposed on the corporation and creates shared incen-
tives to implement and enforce human rights obligations."'
IV. CONTRACTING FOR HuMAN RIGHTS
Thus far this Article has focused on a narrow category of corpora-
tions that are complicit in sovereign human rights abuse. It has sug-
gested that these corporations can and should protect themselves
from potential overexposure to human rights liability by initiating
109 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS, 144-52 (1970); John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 379
(2005).
110 Cf Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 109, 379-80 (arguing that policymakers
should assign costs of workplace accidents to management rather than workers
because management "will be in a relatively good position to induce employees to
change their behavior").
111 Cf CALABRESI, supra note 109, at 147-48 (discussing allocation of car-pedes-
trian accident liability); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2033 (2005) ("Second-order agreements affect who actually
pays the costs of regulatory requirements and thus who has incentives to develop,
implement, and enforce regulatory requirements.").
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arbitration claims against sovereign entities to resolve the question of
who should pay for the unlawful conduct. But this concern is of little
consequence to most corporations who in the main are good corpo-
rate citizens. Indeed, one might say that almost all multinational cor-
porations observe almost all principles of international law almost all
of the time. 1 2 For these corporations the question is not about their
compliance with international norms, but rather how to leverage their
power to promote compliance by their global contractors and suppli-
ers. Increasing attention has been given to the role of multinational
corporations because the corporate sector has "global reach and
capacity and.., is capable of acting at a pace and scale that neither
Governments nor international agencies can match."11 3
Corporations are promising vehicles to secure compliance with
human rights norms when one considers their potential role in shap-
ing behavior by contract. The previous discussion focuses on those
corporations who are bad actors and will facilitate government
responsibility through claims of contribution or indemnification. But
of course many corporations have diverse and numerous incentives to
comply with human rights norms. These corporations will seek to
extend that compliance by imposing contractual obligations on gov-
ernment entities to abide by a set of social and environmental stan-
dards and then impose a dispute settlement mechanism that fosters
compliance with those commitments. Corporations thus contract for
human rights compliance, and secure that compliance through
arbitration.
The potential for using contractual relationships to export
human rights standard- cannot be understated. As one labor rights
activist has concluded, in many countries the sovereign cannot
enforce labor laws and corporations are assuming the role of enforc-
ing core labor standards. "In contrast to some governments, multina-
tionals have the bargaining power and the resources to effect positive
change in the factories that produce for them by requiring implemen-
tation of codes of conduct. This becomes a condition of their
purchasing from factories throughout the supply chain."' 14
112 This is a paraphrase of Louis Henkin's remark about nations. Louis HENKIN,
How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) ("[A]lmost all nations observe almost all prin-
ciples of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.").
113 Ruggie Interim Report, supra note 3, 16, at 6.
114 Auret Van Heerden, President, Fair Labor Ass'n, Human Rights and Brand
Accountability: How Multinationals Can Promote Labor Rights, Testimony Before the
Congressional Human Rights Caucus (Feb. 8, 2006), http://www.fairlabor.org/all/
news/Speeches/FLACHRC2006.pdf.
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The sheer flow of international trade underscores the potential
of outsourcing codes of conduct as a condition of doing business.
According to the United Nations, there are 70,000 transnational cor-
porations, approximately 700,000 subsidiaries, and millions of suppli-
ers that span every corner of the globe. 115 In 2004, direct foreign
investment outflows from Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD) countries amounted to $668 billion, with
the United States accounting for one-third, or $252 billion. 116 The
United States alone exports over $1 trillion in goods and services. 117
Such enormous international trade and finance flows create tremen-
dous opportunities to export not simply goods, services, and invest-
ment, but also values. Increasingly, those values-particularly those
that foster corporate responsibility and a positive public image-are
embedded in contracts as conditions for doing business. Recent
developments indicate that environmental and social standards have
now, in the words of a senior advisor for the International Finance
Corporation, "become the market standard for new project finance
business."1 8
Corporations have numerous incentives to engage in socially
responsible behavior. Many corporations have internalized a code of
conduct that embodies good corporate citizenship. In terms of what
drives companies to embrace good corporate citizenship, the internal
motivators of corporate tradition and business image may be far more
important than external pressures such as consumer expectations,
laws, and political pressure. 1 9 According to one survey, good corpo-
rate citizenship will include: (1) operating with ethical business prac-
115 Ruggie Interim Report, supra note 3, 11, at 5.
116 Hans Christiansen & Ayse Bertrand, Trends and Recent Developments in Foreign
Direct Investment, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 11, 12 (Hans Christian-
sen ed., 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/62/35032229.pdf.
117 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, USA ECONOMY IN BIEF 36 (2006), available at http://
usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/economy-in-brief/economy-in-brief.pdf.
118 Kevin Godier, Int'l Fin. Corp., The Changing View of Governance, in SUSTAINABLE
INVESTMENT 22, 24 (Jon Marks ed., 2004), available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/
publications.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/SustainableInvestment2004/$FILE/Sustainable
Investment2004.pdf.
119 See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & BOSTON COLL., THE STATE OF CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 11 (2003), available at http://www.
uschamber.com/publications/reports/030714.Ccc-survey.htm (follow "Download
and read the results of the survey" hyperlink). Of the 515 respondents to the survey,
the following motivators were identified as driving corporate citizenship: traditions
and values 75%; reputation/image 59%; customers and consumers 53%; business
strategy 52%; recruit/retain employees 38%; expected in community 30%; and laws
and political pressure 24%. See id.
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tices; (2) treating employees well; (3) making a profit, paying taxes,
and providing jobs; (4) providing safe and reliable products and ser-
vices; (5) having a good environmental record; and (6) working to
improve conditions in the community. 120
But of course external pressure will often play a significant role in
molding corporate behavior as well. Shareholders increasingly utilize
socially responsible investment criteria, while corporations brand
their products based on socially responsible behavior and seek to
maintain their good reputation through independent social auditing
of their business practices.121 Every multinational corporation has
numerous stakeholders from whom it must secure and maintain sup-
port. These stakeholders include shareholders, employees, suppliers,
customers, governments, and local communities. As corporate com-
mentators have recently put it,
In this era of globalization, supply chains are facing greater chal-
lenges than ever as products are sourced from a myriad of countries
and factories, with different laws, customs, and standards. Better
organized and more vocal stakeholder groups, reinforced by nega-
tive media coverage, are also pushing companies toward more
responsible supply chain practices. Companies-in a wide range of
industries that reach far beyond apparel and footwear-not only
have to negotiate the geographic complexities of this new reality,
they have to work out to what extent their responsible business prac-
tices can be enforced in third-tier supplier organizations. 122
Significantly, in a globalized economy these stakeholders will
often transcend national boundaries and regional cultural norms.
Upstream supplier demands and downstream customer demands will
often impose standards that exceed the legal requirements or social
expectations of any given local environment. As a result, corporations
both exert and succumb to tremendous external pressure for compli-
ance with ethical practices. The global chain of supply and demand is
a contagion that spreads an ethical behavior pattern from one corpo-
rate group to another through contractual commitments.
Multinational corporations in a globalized economy are able to
maintain their corporate reputations by establishing business relation-
120 See id. at 10. Over 80% surveyed listed the first four within the definition of
good corporate citizenship, and 57% and 50% respectively identified having a good
environmental record and working to improve conditions in the community as part of
good corporate citizenship. Id.
121 See Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the
Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REv. 253, 288-93 (2005).
122 Guy Morgan & Melina Cataife, Responsible Supply Chain Management, IN Focus,
June 2005, at 1, 1.
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ships on their terms. This is facilitated by both the economic power
large multinational corporations yield and by the ever-increasing con-
sumer awareness present in the modern transparent economy. As one
major textile company put it, "Our [Terms of Engagement] are an
integral part of our business relationships. . . . [B]usiness partners
understand that complying with our [Terms of Engagement] is no less
important than meeting our quality standards or delivery times."'123
Suppliers throughout the world are subject to the demands of mul-
tinational corporations who are sensitive to their image as socially
responsible corporate citizens. One prominent corporation has sum-
marized its approach toward human fights in supply chain contracts
in unequivocal terms:
We... understand that we operate in a world with many different
cultures, countries and levels of economic development. Yet even
in this diverse world, we believe there are some standards that cross
borders, levels of development and cultures-and that meeting
these standards is a condition of doing business with Dell. Dell's
approach is drawn from a review of global best practices, manage-
ment systems and acknowledged standards. Included among these
are the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the U.N. Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, fundamental conventions of the
International Labor Organization ... as well as the benchmark of
other corporations and [i]ndustries across the globe. 124
Such reputational concerns reflect an understanding that corpo-
rations are increasingly expected not only to abide by a code of con-
duct, but also to impose a set of ethical standards on their business
123 Levi Strauss & Co., Global Sourcing & Operating Guidelines 1, http://www.levi
strauss.com/Downloads/GSOG.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). Numerous other cor-
porations have imposed similar obligations on their suppliers. See, e.g., CHEVRONTEX-
ACO, 2002 CR REPORT (2003), http://www.chevron.com/GlobalIssues/Corporate
Responsibility/2002/social_issues/humanrights/#a2; Dow, CODE OF BUSINESS CON-
DUCT 8 (2003), available at http://www.dow.com/about/aboutdow/code-conduct/
ethicsconduct.htm (follow "English" hyperlink); EXXONMOBIL, CORPORATE CITIZEN-
SHIP REPORT 40-41 (2006), available at http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/ccr
06/docs/ccr06_fullreport.pdf; NIKE, INC., CODE OF CONDUCT 2 (2007), available at
http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikeresponsibility/tools/Nike_Code of Conduct.pdf;
WAL-MART STORES, INC., STANDARDS FOR SUPPLIERS 1-2 (2005), available at
http://www.walmartstores.com/Files/SupplierStandards-June2005.pdf; Coca-Cola
Co., Around the World: Supplier Guiding Principles, http://www.cokefacts.org/citi-
zenship/cit_awsupplier.shtml (last visited Jan. 14, 2008); Starbucks Corp., Supplier
Code of Conduct, http://www.starbucks.com/aboutus/supplier-code.asp (last visited
Jan. 14, 2008).
124 Dell, Supplier Global Citizenship, http://www.dell.com/content/topics/
global.aspx/corp/sup-prince/en/index?c=us&=en&s=corp (last visited Jan.14,
2008).
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partners. This requirement is reflected in "sourcing guidelines" in'
voluntary corporate codes of conduct, which are often coupled with
outside "social auditors" confirming compliance with these guide-
lines. 1 25  Multinational corporations are also establishing human
rights hotlines to permit informed individuals the opportunity to pro-
vide confidential information in the event any employee, agent, con-
sultant, or contractor is violating the company ethics code.126 Indeed,
in some cases company policies require any employee to inform the
human rights hotline if a breach of the company code of ethics is
occurring. 127
However, not all corporations are so eager to adopt such proac-
tive practices. 128 But there is movement to impose these obligations
on reluctant corporations. A draft U.N. document on corporate
responsibility has stated that "[e]ach transnational corporation . . .
shall apply and incorporate these Norms in their contracts or other
arrangements and dealings with contractors, subcontractors, suppli-
ers, licensees, distributors, or natural or other legal persons that enter
into any agreement with the transnational corporation." 129 In the
event their suppliers and contractors fail to meet such expectations,
transnational corporations "shall cease doing business with them."1 30
125 See Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next
Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 402 (2005). There are numerous examples of
such sourcing guidelines and social audits. See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC CERTIFICATION SYS.,
C.A.F.E. PRACTICES GENERIC EVALUATION GUIDELINES, STARBUCKS COFFEE COMPANY
(2004), http://www.scscertified.com/csrpurchasing/docs/CAFEPracticesEvaluation
Guidelinesll0904English.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2008); SCIENTIFIC CERTIFICATION
Sys., STARBUCKS C.A.F.E. PRACTICES, http://www.scscertified.com/csrpurchasing/star
bucks.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008); Coca-Cola Co., supra note 123.
126 See CHEVRONTEXACO, supra note 123.
127 See id.
128 For example, Laura Dickinson has examined the military and foreign aid con-
tracts between the U.S. government and private contactors that do business in Iraq.
Of the sixty publicly available Iraq contracts, she reports that none contain specific
provisions requiring contractors to obey human rights, anticorruption, or trans-
parency norms. See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31
YALEJ. INT'L L. 383, 403-04 (2006).
129 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-
Comm'n on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, art. 15, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug.
26, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/64155e7e
8141b38ccl 256d63002c55e8?Opendocument.
130 David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
901, 911 (2003) (discussing commentary to the U.N. report). For a discussion of
corporate criticism of the report, see Murphy, supra note 125, at 408.
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The OECD is more cautious in its guidelines, calling on multinational
corporations to "encourage... business partners, including suppliers
and sub-contractors, to apply principles of corporate conduct compat-
ible with the guidelines." 13 1 Such developments make explicit that
transnational corporations should endeavor to include human rights
norms in their contracts and that failure to abide by such contractual
obligations may constitute a material breach thatjustifies termination
of the business relationship.
There are numerous instances in which such recommendations
are finding practical application. In particular, financial institutions
are taking a leading role in imposing human rights obligations in
their project finance contracts. One of the most significant develop-
ments regarding contractual commitments to comply with human
rights norms are the so-called "Equator Principles," established in
2003 and now adopted by over fifty major public and private commer-
cial banks.' 3 2 Equator Principle banks undertake to provide loans
directly to projects only if the borrower has completed an environ-
mental and social impact assessment and covenanted to comply with
certain social and environmental commitments. 133 These commit-
ments address, among other things, baseline social conditions,
requirements under applicable domestic and international law, pro-
tection of occupational health and safety, land acquisition and land
use, involuntary resettlement, and impacts on indigenous communi-
ties.' 34 The Equator Principles represent the privatization of social
and environmental issues, in which "informal networks are emerging
that link influential nongovernmental organizations, giant corpora-
131 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], COMM. ON INT'L INV. & MUL-
TINAT'L ENTERS., THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES pt. I, § II,
10, at 11 (2001), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2O00doc.nsf/LinkTo/
daffe-ime-wpg(2000)15-final (follow the British flag hyperlink). The more cautious
approach reflects the OECD's recognition that "there are practical limitations to the
ability of enterprises to influence the conduct of their business partners." Id. at 13.
132 A complete list of adopting banks is available at The Equator Principles,
http://www.equator-principles.com/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). These banks com-
prise over 85% of international project financing. Kimberly Gaskin, A Question of Prin-
ciples, INFRASTRUCTURE MAG., June 2007, at 58, 60.
133 THE "EQUATOR PRINCIPLES" 2-4 (2006), available at http://www.equator-princi-
ples.com/documents/EquatorPrinciples.pdf. The Principles incorporate safeguard
policies which set minimum environmental and social standards. These policies are
promulgated by the International Finance Corporation, the private sector arm of the
World Bank. For the full text of these policies, see INT'L FIN. CORP., WORLD BANK
GROUP, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY
(2006), available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/Content/Performance
Standards (follow "English" hyperlink under "Performance Standards").
134 Id.
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tions and governments that want to solve social problems.' 3 5 Socially
responsible financing is now becoming embedded in contractual com-
mitments in project finance agreements. I 36
Finance agreements that incorporate Equator Principles thus
become an important vehicle for private monitoring and implementa-
tion of human rights norms. Prospective borrowers have incentives to
present a low-risk regulatory profile to lenders, and so they will self-
monitor and implement human rights requirements. Borrowers also
implement human rights directives in anticipation of or in response
to lender monitoring and enforcement. 137 The effect of finance
agreements with Equator Principles is "to provide lenders, which
often have an interest in ensuring that debtors do not engage in...
risky behavior, with the legal right to monitor and enforce their inter-
ests during the course of the loan. '13 8
The Equator Principles include a number of important provi-
sions. First, they require independent third-party review of projects to
ensure compliance with the principles. 13 9 Second, they require all
Equator Principle Financial Institutions (EPFIs) to include covenants
in financing documentation, including compliance with all relevant
host country social and environmental laws and the "action plan" that
has been developed to comply with applicable performance stan-
dards. 40 Third, they provide that failure to comply with these cove-
nants may result in remedial action by the EPFIs.1 4 1
135 David Ignatius, Corporate Green, WASH. POST, May 11, 2005, at A17.
136 William L. Thomas, Equator-Risk and Sustainability, in PROJECT FINANCE INTER-
NATIONAL YEARBOOK 10, 10-14 (2004).
137 Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 2053-54.
138 Id. at 2055.
139 See THE "EQUATOR PRINCIPLES," supra note 133, at 4 ("For all Category A
projects, and, as appropriate, for Category B projects, an independent social or envi-
ronmental expert not directly associated with the borrower will review the Assessment,
AP [Action Plan] and consultation process documentation in order to assist the
EPFI's due diligence, and assess Equator Principles compliance.").
140 See id. at 4 ("An important strength of the Principles is the incorporation of
covenants linked to compliance. For Category A and B projects, the borrower will
covenant in financing documentation: a) to comply with all relevant host country
social and environmental laws, regulations and permits in all material respects; b) to
comply with the AP (where applicable) during the construction and operation of the
project in all material respects ....").
141 See id. ("Where a borrower is not in compliance with its social and environmen-
tal covenants, EPFIs will work with the borrower to bring it back into compliance to
the extent feasible, and if the borrower fails to re-establish compliance within an
agreed grace period, EPFIs reserve the right to exercise remedies, as they consider
appropriate.").
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By including contractual commitments in loan agreements
requiring borrowers to comply with environmental and social stan-
dards, major public and private banks have significant leverage to
bring their borrowers to the table to negotiate mechanisms for resolv-
ing human rights concerns before and after they arise. While these
banks do not have direct control over third parties participating in the
project, they can secure commitments from multinational corpora-
tions to address major social concerns. These corporations in turn
can address concerns raised by the banks by securing downstream
contractual commitments from other parties involved in the project
so that they will comply with Equator environmental and social stan-
dards.' 42 In the event any of these other entities are sovereign instru-
mentalities, they will address immunity concerns either through a
waiver of immunity or a broadly worded arbitration clause that
achieves a similar effect. Human rights commitments in the loan
agreements beget similar commitments from project finance partners,
sovereign or otherwise. 143 Corporations have thus contracted for
compliance with human rights standards.
It is anticipated that banks will expand the Equator Principles to
other areas of finance, including corporate finance and retail bank-
ing, and broaden it to other types of financial institutions, including
export credit agencies, bilateral agencies, and developing country
banks. 144 The Equator Principles have set in motion a "movement
towards globally recognized environmental and social standards."145
Large private business projects "must have adequate environmental
and social safeguards to be viable financially" because "banks simply
are not willing to take huge financial risks unless they are confident
142 Interview with Suellen Lambert Lazarus, Senior Advisor to Vice President of
Operations, Int'l Fin. Corp. (June 30, 2005).
143 Indeed, the more progressive Equator banks have stated the intent to pursue
these downstream commitments in their publicly available annual Corporate Social
Responsibility Reports. See MICHELLE CHAN-FISHEL, BANKTRACK, UNPROVEN PRINCIPLES
18-39 (2005), available at http://www.banktrack.org/?show=86&visitor=l (follow
"banktrack on equator principles" hyperlink; then follow "Unproven Principles; the
Equator Principles at year two" hyperlink); HSBC HOLDINGS, 2006 CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 18-19 (2006), available at http://www.hsbc.com/1/PA.1_1
S5/content/assets/csr/2006_hsbccr report.pdf.
144 See Suellen Lazarus, Banking on the Future: The Equator Principles and the Project
Finance Market, at 7, available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/equatorprinciples.nsf/
AttachmentsByTitle/EuromoneySyndicatedLendingHandbook2005/$FILE/Synd
Lend-IFC02.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
145 Id.
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that other risks have been contained."'146 It is clear from these devel-
opments that banks are taking human rights more seriously than ever.
And the pressure to do so will only increase. Already civil society is
threatening financial institutions with "complicity in human rights vio-
lations" if they do not take concrete steps to secure their borrowers'
compliance with core human rights obligations, including contractual
covenants for compliance and the suspension or termination of the
contract for breaches of those covenants.1 47
A similar initiative is underway in the retail context under the
auspices of an international network called the Fair Labor Association
(FLA). FLA has established a code of conduct that includes regula-
tion of forced labor, child labor, harassment and abuse, nondiscrimi-
nation, health and safety, freedom of association, wages and benefits,
and overtime compensation.1 48 There are over twenty leading retail
brand name companies 49 and over two hundred colleges and univer-
sities that are participating in FLA.150 Every corporation that is a
member of FLA agrees to abide by these core labor standards and
commits to secure written agreements with company factories, con-
tractors, and suppliers to submit to periodic inspection and audits for
compliance with the workplace standards. 1 5 1 Likewise, every college
or university that is affiliated with FLA requires its licensees to become
members of FLA, thereby imposing strict codes of conduct on compa-
nies that manufacture products under the university license. 152 Labor
experts have argued that these contractual obligations imposed by
multinational corporations and universities are more effective than
labor laws and regulations imposed by national governments or the
International Labor Organization. "Governments are not able to leg-
islate labor markets because globalization is outstripping the power of
146 Peter Woicke, Int'l Fin. Corp., Sustainable Business Is Good Business, in SUSTAINA-
BLE INVESTMENT, supra note 118, at 1, 3.
147 JAN CAPPELLE, BANKTRACK, HUMAN RIGHTS, BANKING RISKS 14-20 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.banktrack.org/?show=86&visitor=l (follow "banktrack on human
rights" hyperlink; then follow "Human Rights, Banking Risks" hyperlink).
148 See Fair Labor Ass'n, FLA Workplace Code of Conduct (2005), http://
64.78.1.52/conduct (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
149 See Fair Labor Ass'n, Companies, Suppliers and Licensees, http://64.78.1.52/
participants/companies (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
150 See Fair Labor Ass'n, Colleges and Universities, http://64.78.1.52/partici-
pants/colleges (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
151 FAIR LABOR ASS'N, MONITORING GUIDANCE & COMPLIANCE BENCHMARKS 56
(2007), available at http://fairlabor.org/about/monitoring/compliance (follow
"click here" hyperlink following "To view the full report on Monitoring Guidance").
152 Fair Labor Ass'n, About the Collegiate Licensee Program, http://64.78.1.52/
applications/licensee-program (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
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governments.... [As a result,] private actors are assuming state func-
tions. '' 153 The suppliers may not listen to the International Labor
Organization, but they will listen to the brand name labels, which in
turn are listening to consumer demand for social responsibility. 154
The recent Caspian Sea pipeline project represents another
important example of the implementation of social responsibility
clauses. Opened in 2005, the $3.6 billion pipeline carries oil from
Baku, Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to Turkey's Mediterranean
coast.155 It was financed by public and private banks that had adopted
the Equator Principles. 15 6 These banks held multistakeholder forum
meetings on the project, and a 120-day comment period on the envi-
ronmental and social impact assessment was provided.157 The Inter-
national Finance Corporation published a detailed response to the
comments and enlisted independent environmental and social spe-
cialists and engineers, working on behalf of the financial institutions,
to evaluate all of the project work. 158 What is particularly encouraging
is that social and environmental commitments are key components of
the pipeline project and that these contractual undertakings are
monitored by the contracting parties and independent NGOs, with
the participating multinational corporations having direct recourse to
arbitration mechanisms in the project finance agreement to facilitate
dispute resolution over any failure to comply with the social responsi-
bility clauses. 159
The contractual rights of these corporations aptly illustrate the
procedural mechanisms for overcoming claims of sovereign immunity
for human rights violations in international agreements. For exam-
ple, the petroleum corporations recognize that they will "be held
responsible for the environmental, social, and technical commitments
153 Online Extra, A Lion for Workers'Rights, Bus. WK., Nov. 27, 2006, http://www.
businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_48/b401101.htm.
154 Cf id. ("The most powerful force is when consumers demand social responsi-
bility from labels.").
155 Suellen Lazarus, A Matter of Principal, PROJECT FIN. MAG., Mar. 3, 2004, at 56,
58, available at http://www.equator-principles.com/pfm2.shtml.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See id. For an example of such a social impact assessment, see AETC LTD. &
ERm, BP, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, § 1, at 1-1 to 1-26 (2002),
available at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9006634&contentld=
7013340 (follow "Section 1-Executive Summary" hyperlink).
159 See, e.g., Host Government Agreement Between and Among the Government
of the Republic of Turkey and [the MEP Participants] art. 18 & app. 5, Nov. 16, 1999
[hereinafter Turkey Agreement], available at http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/BTC/
Eng/agmt3/agmt3.pdf.
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made to the International Financial Institutions . . . and the public"
and they "will be judged by whether the high standards they have
established for the Project are in fact realized." 160 In light of this, they
have been forced to consider work stoppage on the recent Caspian
Sea pipeline project to ensure that the Turkish governmental authori-
ties in charge of the pipeline project fulfill the commitments they
have made in their environmental and social impact assessments.1 61
The contract imposes stringent environmental and social obligations
on the contracting parties, including the obligation to "comply with
good international Petroleum industry standards and practice" and to
"use Best Endeavors to minimise potential disturbances to surround-
ing communities and the property of the inhabitants thereof. ' 162 In
the event there is a dispute, the agreement stipulates that "[a] ny dis-
pute arising under this Agreement, or in any way connected with this
Agreement . . . between (i) the Government, the State, any State
Entity, and/or the Local Authorities ... and (ii) one or more of the
... Participants ... may be submitted to arbitration."1 63 Further, each
state entity "waives any claim to immunity in regard to any proceed-
ings to enforce this Agreement ... or any final award rendered by an
arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to this Agreement."1 64 The
agreement thus authorizes the petroleum corporations to take appro-
priate measures to ensure compliance with international human
rights norms embodied in the agreement, and the dispute settlement
provisions of the agreement provide effective recourse against the sov-
ereign entities in the event of contractual noncompliance.
As the Caspian Sea pipeline project illustrates, foreign sovereign
immunity is a right that sovereigns have long been willing to forego in
doing business with multinational corporations. When lucrative con-
tractual opportunities are presented and contracting parties demand
it, sovereign entities will relent and afford their business partners with
an effective dispute resolution procedure. Foreign investment agree-
ments have typically incorporated arbitration agreements and waiver
of immunity clauses to guarantee that foreign investors will have legal
recourse in the event of sovereign noncompliance. As discussed
above, the demands of international business have established a
160 CASPIAN DEV. ADVISORY PANEL, REPORT ON TURKEY AND PROJECT-RELATED SECUR-
IT' AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA, AND TURKEY § VII, at 82-85
(2003), available at http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/mediaLibrary/Download/59/
CDAP%20Turkey%20Report%20Final.pdf.
161 See id. § VII, at 85.
162 Turkey Agreement, supra note 159, app. 5, §§ 2.1, 4.1.
163 Id. art. 18.1.
164 Id. art. 18.11.
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robust and effective procedure for resolving such international dis-
putes. The novelty of the current movement is to expand the subject
matter to which contractual obligations apply. By imposing social and
environmental covenants in contracts with sovereign entities, corpora-
tions stand in the uniquely powerful position of imposing human
rights obligations on sovereigns and having those commitments
enforced through arbitration.
One of the most promising tools for the promotion of human
rights is to leverage the power of corporations. Based on current
trends, one can anticipate that many corporations will increasingly
include core human rights and environmental standards as contrac-
tual covenants in their international agreements. These contracts will
also include grievance procedures, including arbitration, as a com-
mon mechanism for dispute resolution. Serious noncompliance with
substantive contractual obligations will trigger invocation of the dis-
pute resolution provisions. Thus, by contracting for human rights as a
substantive obligation and contracting for arbitration as a procedural
guarantee, corporations throughout the globe can establish a firm
basis for the promotion of human rights within their spheres of influ-
ence. International agreements that incorporate human rights com-
mitments crystallize incentives and create explicit legal authority in
private parties to monitor, enforce, and create human rights stan-
dards, thereby increasing pressure for compliance by contract. 165
V. THIRD-PART BENEFICIARIES AND HuMAN RIGHTS
The final frontier for arbitrating human rights claims is contrac-
tual empowerment of third parties. This approach takes general theo-
ries of contractual third-party beneficiary rights, applies it to the
dispute resolution context, and then includes within its scope contrac-
tual claims for human rights violations. This approach suggests that
there are legal mechanisms available to permit human rights victims
or human rights organizations to monitor abuses and pursue remedia-
tion as third-party beneficiaries.
It is well recognized that arbitration can be invoked by nonsig-
natories to the agreement provided the parties intend to grant such a
right to third parties. The trend in many jurisdictions is towards
greater recognition of third-party beneficiary rights to arbitrate dis-
putes. 166 For example, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,'167 the
165 See Vandenbergh, supra note 111, at 2095.
166 James M. Hosking, The Third Party Non-Signatory's Ability to Compel International
Commercial Arbitration: Doing Justice Without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J.
469, 527 (2004) (discussing England, France, and the United States).
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Supreme Court upheld a claim by a third-party brokerage house to
arbitrate a dispute with a broker pursuant to an agreement embedded
in the broker's registration with the New York Stock Exchange. 16
The provision stated that the parties agreed to arbitrate "[a] ny contro-
versy between a registered representative and any member or member
organization arising out of the employment or termination of employ-
ment of such registered representative."'169 Thus, courts in the United
States have embraced the use of third-party beneficiary rights to
require arbitration between a contracting party and a noncontracting
party of international disputes.1 70
While the concept of enforcing third-party beneficiary rights to
arbitrate is not controversial, the application of that principle to the
human rights context is in its infancy. The essential idea is that corpo-
rations can grant to a narrow category of constituents third-party ben-
eficiary rights to address human rights concerns arising out of the
contract. For example, granting employees or specific labor groups
the opportunity to employ a dispute resolution procedure to resolve
questions of violations of labor standards arising from a supply con-
tract is a plausible possibility, far more so than, say, granting third-
party rights to the larger community of persons who might be injured
by environmental harms. As discussed in the previous Part, it also
presumes that the agreement articulates contractually based human
rights standards that must be satisfied by the parties. y1 7 The result
would be to use international agreements as a means to empower a
narrow set of third parties-such as employees or human rights orga-
nizations-with the right to challenge contractual human rights viola-
tions through an effective dispute resolution procedure.
167 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
168 See id. at 23.
169 Id. (quoting NYSE Rule 347).
170 See, e.g., Cargill Int'l S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1019-20 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("In order to enforce the agreement as a third party beneficiary, CBV must
show that 'the parties to that contract intended to confer a benefit on [it] when con-
tracting; it is not enough that some benefit incidental to the performance of the con-
tract may accrue to [it].' . . . [I]f CBV is found to be a third party beneficiary to the
Charter Party, it may be proper for the district court to enforce the arbitration agree-
ment against [government-owned] Novorossiysk." (citations omitted)). More gener-
ally, Restatement section 302 provides that a third party may be an "intended
beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate
to effectuate the intention of the parties and ... the circumstances indicate that the
promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRArS § 302(1) (1979).
171 See supra Part IV.
2oo8]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
One can rarely find examples of this approach in current prac-
tice. As suggested above, arbitrating human rights violations between
contracting parties itself is novel, to say nothing of empowering third
parties to do so. But there is no inherent reason why corporations
may not wish to implement such procedures. A recent United
Nations survey of Fortune Global 500 companies reported that
"[m] ost companies indicate that they work with external stakeholders
in developing and implementing their human rights policies," with
NGOs ranked as the most frequent partners. 172 There are also useful
analogies from existing practice to suggest that corporations may be
open to such third-party beneficiary rights. A number of rights-
property rights, intellectual property rights, privacy rights-are sub-
ject to third-party international arbitration.1 73 As the international
arbitration law matures, the demand for such a third-party mechanism
will grow, as is evident in its development in other contexts.
Undoubtedly the most important example of third-party arbitra-
tion relates to investment disputes. One can draw insights from the
burgeoning public international practice of arbitrating third-party for-
eign investment disputes pursuant to bilateral investment treaties
(BITs). In a typical BIT, the host country will authorize a national of
the other contracting state to arbitrate claims for treaty violations
relating to investment in that country. As the model United States
bilateral investment treaty states, a private "claimant, on its own
behalf, may submit to arbitration... a claim.., that the [state party]
respondent has breached . . . an [applicable treaty] obligation . . .
or... an investment agreement."'174 Investment arbitration has come
into its own, with investor claims against sovereigns as one of the most
important developments in the field of international arbitration. In
the 1990s, there was a veritable explosion of BITs, with over 2000
signed and the overwhelming majority containing consents on the
part of the states to submit investment disputes to arbitration. 175
172 Ruggie Interim Report, supra note 3, 37, at 10.
173 See, e.g., M. Scott Donahey, Enforcement of Injunctive Relief and Arbitration Awards
Concerning Title to and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Asia and the Pacific Rim,
19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 727, 728-29 (1996).
174 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 24 (2004), available at http://www.
ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/assetupload-file847_6897.
pdf.
175 Jos6 Alvarez, The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment Regime, 99 Am. Soc'y INT'L L.
PRoc. 94, 94 (2005) ("The emerging regime for foreign direct investment... consists
of obligations imposed under some two thousand bilateral investment treaties (BITs),
regional free trade agreements (FTAs), specialized multilateral treaties ... and soft
law instruments .... "); Todd Weiler, NAFTA Article 1105 and the Principles of Interna-
tional Economic Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 35, 84 (2003) ("International invest-
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So commonplace is the current practice of third-party foreign
investor arbitration pursuant to an investment treaty that its novelty is
often ignored. But in reality, this approach is a recent innovation that
can be traced to the early 1980s. At that time, the United States
decided to depart from its traditional approach of signing broad
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) treaties and establish a
new approach of negotiating model BITs with greater protections for
foreign investors.1 76 States are willing to grant third-party nationals
such power because they recognize that it is in their interests to pro-
mote greater economic cooperation between the two countries. An
agreed standard on the treatment to be accorded to foreign invest-
ment will stimulate the flow of private capital and economic develop-
ment.177 In short, contracting parties grant third-party constituents
the right to arbitrate their investment disputes because it is an effec-
tive means to promote their own interests in economic development.
Recognizing that ad hoc contractual guarantees may not be sufficient
to achieve this result, contracting states impose an international mini-
mum standard and empower private parties to bring claims against
sovereign entities when that standard is breached.
But empowering foreign investors to directly arbitrate claims
against the host sovereign also has the distinct advantage of
depoliticizing investment disputes. The traditional approach of gov-
ernmental involvement in private investment disputes inevitably com-
plicates the conduct of foreign policy. The BIT approach establishes
legal remedies and procedures for investment disputes that do not
necessitate the involvement of the investor's own government. 178
Enhancing the rights of foreign investors not only frees them to pur-
sue their specific claims, it frees the U.S. government to wash its hands
of routine business disputes.
One could well analogize between the sovereign interest in facili-
tating dispute settlement for its constituents and the corporate inter-
est in facilitating dispute settlement for its constituents. Both the state
and the corporation represent a collective means of achieving the eco-
nomic purpose of its members, who themselves constitute the reality
ment protection has matured as the essentially unenforceable friendship, commerce,
and navigation treaties have gradually been replaced by an increasing web of over two
thousand BITs, which contain binding investor-state arbitration clauses.").
176 See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on
Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT'L TAx & Bus. LAw. 105,
109-10 (1986).
177 See U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 174, pmbl.
178 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14
MICH. J. INT'L L. 621, 626 (1993).
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behind it. A state achieves the ends of its members by contracting to
afford their investments an effective mechanism against foreign sover-
eign abuse. Likewise, a corporation may wish to achieve the ends of
its members by contracting to afford their endeavors with effective
recourse against abuse. The corporation has a stake in the abuse of
those in its supply chain because they are an integral part of its
broader constituency.
From the perspective of the foreign investor, treaty-based third-
party standing in the investment context was born out of necessity. As
one commentator recently noted:
Prior to the advent of bilateral investment treaties, investors from
developed nations often faced problems of expropriation without
compensation by host states pursuing a protectionist economic pol-
icy. Resort to the national courts of the very same government that
was infringing the investor's property interests often proved ineffec-
tive and deprived the foreign investor of a neutral forum. Nor was it
feasible to resort to the investor's home state in light of doctrines
that foreign sovereign immunity and separation of powers protected
the host state from being prosecuted in the domestic court of
another state. The doctrine of diplomatic protection, which is the
traditional manner in which private rights of nationals are vindi-
cated by home states at the state to state level, proved too inefficient
and provided far too much discretion to the state of nationality in
pursuing the claims of their nationals.
The point is that private party standing in investment disputes
is the result of evolution from the lack of existing feasible
alternatives. 179
Likewise, one could say that employees working in foreign coun-
tries in connection with multilateral projects who are subject to labor
violations may face a similar plight. Resort to national courts where
the violation occurred will often be unavailing, and litigation in a for-
eign court may be unavailable or unduly cumbersome and expensive.
Therefore, third-party empowerment to resolve labor abuses may well
evolve because of the lack of effective alternatives.
One can see precisely such a contractual solution in the intellec-
tual property context. While investor-state investment disputes are apt
analogies for third-party beneficiary rights established by treaty, the
most successful example of contractual third-party beneficiary rights
to resolve disputes is in the context of domain names. In the early
days of the Internet, domain names were registered on a first-come,
179 Naveen Gurudevan, Comment, An Evaluation of Current Legitimacy-Based Objec-
tions to NAFTA's Chapter 11 Investment Dispute Resolution Process, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
399, 421 (2005) (citations omitted).
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first-serve basis without regard to intellectual property claims.' 8 0
Trademark holders who delayed registering their corporate names
faced a dilemma: either sue a "cybersquatter" who held a domain
name in a foreign court or accede to his demand for money to trans-
fer the domain name to the rightful owner of the trademark. To
address this concern, Internet registrars adopted new policies that
included mandatory third-party arbitration in the registration agree-
ments. 8 1 Every person or entity who owns a generic top-level domain
name (i.e., ".com, .org, .net") now agrees by contract to empower
third-party intellectual property owners with the authority to chal-
lenge their rightful ownership of the registered domain name. 182
An example of one such agreement used by Network Solutions
provides that "[i]f you registered a domain name through us, you
agree to be bound by our current domain name dispute policy that is
incorporated herein and made a part of this Agreement by refer-
ence." 18 3 Such a policy provides that each domain name holder is
required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the
event that a third party asserts ... that ... (i) your domain name is
identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in
which the complainant has rights; and (ii) you have no rights or
legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) your
domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. 18 4
The important point about the domain name dispute resolution
process is that registration companies recognized the power of the
registration contract to enable third parties to bring a complaint
against those who abused the property right.
In this manner, third parties who possess intellectual property
rights can initiate claims before the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) for unlawful conduct against domain name
holders and secure the transfer of the domain name. Since this new
procedure went into effect in December 1999, WIPO has'handled
180 James Gleick, Get Out of My Namespace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 44.
181 See INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & Nos., UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (1999), http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm
[hereinafter ICANN].
182 See id.
183 Network Solutions, Service Agreement, sched. A, § 5, https://www.network-
solutions.com/enUS/legal/static-service-agreement.jhtml (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
184 ICANN, supra note 181, 1 4.
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over 10,500 disputes18 5 involving parties from 145 countries. 18 6 On
average, WIPO receives three new cases per day, and the complainant
has succeeded over eighty percent of the time. 187 In short, domain
name registration contracts grant third-party beneficiary rights to
those injured by intellectual property violations, and an effective
mechanism for dispute resolution has resolved what had been viewed
as an intractable problem.
Having examined these analogies, can one identify instances of
the establishment of third-party beneficiary rights to resolve disputes
in the international human rights context? With respect to the Equa-
tor Principles, there are two provisions that begin to address the idea
of third-party rights to monitor and enforce human rights. First, as
noted above, the Equator Principles include a provision for third-
party review of compliance with social covenants. 188 "The purpose of
the review is to assist the EPFI [Equator Principle Financial Institu-
tion] in their [sic] due diligence of the development and operation of
the project and in respect of [Equator Principle] compliance .... ."189
Second, EPFIs are required to ensure that "borrower[s] will... estab-
lish a grievance mechanism . . . [that] will allow the borrower to
receive and facilitate resolution of concerns and grievances about the
project's social and environmental performance raised by individuals
or groups from among project-affected communities."190 The pur-
pose of these grievance procedures is to help ensure that "borrowers
and [EPFIs] become more transparent and accountable to both the
communities affected directly by such projects and civil society gener-
ally." 19 1 While there is no indication that this grievance procedure
creates third-party rights to binding arbitration, it does go far in estab-
185 See World Intellectual Prop. Org., UDRP Procedures for Generic Top Level
Domains (gTLDs), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/gtld/udrp/index.html
(last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
186 See World Intellectual Prop. Org., Geographical Distribution of Parties, http://
www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/countries-a-z.jsp (last visited Jan. 14,
2008).
187 See Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org., WIPO Continues Efforts to
Curb Cybersquatting (Feb. 18, 2005), available at http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/
article.asp?id=2150&deptid=6.
188 See THE "EQUATOR PRINCIPLES," supra note 133, princ. 7, at 4.
189 Memorandum from Paul Q. Watchman et al., LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene &
MacRae, to Clients, EP 2: The Revised Equator Principles 16 (Jan. 2007), available at
http://www.equator-principles.com/documents/ClientBriefingforEquatorPrinciples-
2007-02-07.pdf.
190 THE "EQUATOR PRINCIPLES," supra note 133, princ. 6, at 4.
191 Memorandum from Paul Q. Watchman et al., supra note 189, at 17-18.
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lishing a mechanism for third-party complaints to be seriously
addressed by borrowers and financial institutions. 192
Another good example comes from the international labor con-
text, where multinational corporations are partnering with human
rights NGOs to address concerns for core labor standards in global
supply contracts. As discussed in the previous Part, the FLA has affili-
ated with over twenty multinational retail companies and over 194 col-
leges and universities to incorporate core labor standards in all
agreements with their contractors, suppliers, and licensees.193 But the
FLA goes further than this and establishes relationships with twenty
accredited monitors to audit compliance with labor standards. 94 Sig-
nificantly, all companies that are members of the FLA are obligated to
obtain "written agreement of Company factories ... contractors and
suppliers to submit to periodic inspections and audits .. .by accred-
ited external monitors, for compliance with . . . workplace stan-
dards."' 95 Affiliated companies are also required to establish a third-
party complaint procedure in which any individual or group may file a
third-party complaint with the FLA on behalf of one or more workers
employed at a factory producing for FLA companies.' 9 6 If the FLA
verifies a violation of the code of conduct, it is empowered to engage
with the relevant actors in the factories to pursue remediation and
resolve the problem.' 97 One such third-party complaint concerned
rights to association at a Nike factory in Thailand. Following the com-
plaint, the FLA mediated the dispute between the terminated employ-
ees and local management. The result was reinstatement of the
employees, back pay, and an agreement with the local labor unions. 19 8
192 NGOs have expressed concern that the grievance procedure does not guaran-
tee that the process will be fair, transparent, impartial, accessible, and responsive in
reviewing project compliance and in reacting to and adequately addressing commu-
nity concerns. See ANDREA DURBIN, BANKTRACK, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES II: NGO COM-
MENTS ON THE PROPOSED REVISION OF THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES § 2.1, at 11 (2006),
available at http://www.banktrack.org/?show-86&visitor=l (follow "banktrack on
equator principles" hyperlink; then follow "Equator Principles II-NGO Comments"
hyperlink).
193 See supra text accompanying notes 148-54.
194 See FLA Accredited Monitors, http://www.fairlabor.org/about/monitoring/
accredmon (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
195 Fair Labor Ass'n, Principles of Monitoring pt. I.A, http://www.fairlabor.org/
all/code/FLA PRINCIPLESOFMONITORING.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
196 See Fair Labor Ass'n, Monitoring, http://www.fairlabor.org/about/monitoring
(last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
197 See Fair Labor Ass'n, Third Party Complaints, http://www.fairlabor.org/
about/complaints (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
198 See FAIR LABOR ASS'N, 2006 ANNUAL PUBLIC REPORT 23-24 (2006), available at
http://www.fairlabor.org/all/2006PublicReport.pdf.
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This process is being replicated by other NGOs that are establish-
ing partnerships between multinational corporations to empower
third parties to monitor, intervene, and remediate core labor viola-
tions. For example, one such organization, Verit6, has partnered with
dozens of multinational corporations to conduct "social audits" of
over 1300 factories in sixty countries to strengthen compliance with
international labor standards.1 99 Their recommendations include
grievance procedures that incorporate employee arbitration as a dis-
pute settlement mechanism.200
In all of these examples, the role of third parties is typically to
secure prospective compliance, not compensate for past injuries. If
corporations are convinced that third-party involvement can enhance
compliance, then they may agree to grant a limited degree of third-
party rights in the international agreements, rights such as helping
monitor risks and remedy violations. Those third-party rights are
unlikely to include binding arbitration to render monetary compensa-
tion against a contracting party. But a mechanism for monitoring and
remediation of violations will go far toward compliance with contrac-
tual social responsibility norms.
Based on these early developments, one can hope that multina-
tional corporations will find it increasingly in their interests to include
contractual provisions in their international agreements that
empower independent third parties to participate in the resolution of
conflicts over core human rights standards arising from those agree-
ments. In so doing, multinational corporations have the potential to
be instrumental in enhancing the living and working conditions of its
stakeholders. But thus far the experiments with third-party benefici-
ary rights pertaining to core labor standards in international agree-
ments are insignificant. The patchwork of monitoring and
compliance efforts lack scale, coordination, and sustainability.
CONCLUSION
There is an ancient story about a prophet named Samuel who was
called to the house of Jesse to anoint one of his sons to be king of
Israel. 20 1 The prophet Samuel looked at the eldest son and thought
to himself, "Surely this is the anointed one." But the Lord said to
Samuel, "Do not consider his appearance or his height for I have
199 See Verit6, Client Services & Programs, http://www.verite.org/services/
main.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
200 See VERrrr, COMPREHENSIVE FACTORY EVALUATION REPORT 11 (2001), available at
http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/gc/mp/pdf/nike-verite-report.pdf.
201 See I Samuel 16:1-13.
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rejected him." Then one by one the other sons of Jesse passed before
Samuel. And each one failed the test. After rejecting the final son,
Samuel became exasperated and turned to Jesse and said, "Are these
all the sons you have?" Jesse said, "Well there is still the youngest,
David, but he is out in the field tending sheep." Jesse brought David
to Samuel, and as soon as Samuel saw David, the Lord said to him,
"This is the one." David was anointed, and soon thereafter slew the
giant Goliath.
The same could be said today of sovereign immunity for human
rights abuses. If one were to ask which exception to sovereign immu-
nity is the most promising to secure accountability for human rights
violations, which would one choose? Commercial activity? Implied
waivers? Expropriated property? Noncommercial torts within the
United States? Each of these exceptions to the FSIA was once thought
to be quite promising, and each has been found wanting. But there is
another option, another exception that is the great surprise. The
arbitration exception is the inspired choice and the stealth weapon in
the battle against the giant problem of sovereign abuse of human
rights. By using the power of corporations to arbitrate human rights,
sovereigns can be held accountable.
There can be little doubt that the issue of corporate liability for
human rights abuse is gaining currency. International human rights
are now part of the "frontier expectations" for multinational corpora-
tions, expectations that were nonexistent in past years but now are
very much part of our shared presumptions of good corporate behav-
ior.20 2 This Article recognizes the looming reality that corporations
increasingly will be held liable for international human rights viola-
tions. Thus far, the scholarly literature addressing the intersection of
corporations and human rights has been decidedly and needlessly
negative. This Article attempts to look at the issue from another per-
spective, and appreciate the possibilities that this trend might afford
for more widespread compliance with human rights.
There are numerous responses that corporations might take to
address this development. The current strategy appears to be a direct,
frontal challenge to the imposition of liability. But if that battle is lost,
a secondary approach is one of shared responsibility and cost avoid-
ance. Corporations should entertain the option of arbitrating with
202 "Companies have always had a contract with society.... Most multinationals in
the United States, for example, are expected to maintain at least some labor standards
along their global supply chains, even if they aren't legally required to do so. Viola-
tions of that semiformal contractual obligation can seriously harm a company's repu-
tation as well as consumer demand for its products. .. ." Sheila M.J. Bonini et al.,
When Social Issues Become Strategic, MCKINSEY Q., May 2006, at 23.
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sovereigns the question of who pays for human fights abuse in order
to maximize fairness between malfeasors and to enhance the likeli-
hood that the cheapest cost avoiders will prevent the human rights
abuse. If corporations are to be held responsible for aiding and abet-
ting sovereign abuse, they need not do so alone. They can mitigate
their exposure and share the responsibility by invoking existing tools
of contract law and arbitration against sovereign joint malfeasors.
As corporations increasingly recognize the importance of human
rights in their global practices, they will become attuned to the role of
deterrence and employ the tools of contract law and arbitration to
facilitate that deterrence. Incorporating social responsibility cove-
nants in international agreements is one of the best vehicles to
enhance compliance with core human rights, and including effective
dispute resolution procedures in turn fosters compliance with con-
tractual commitments.
The final consideration in the use of contract law and arbitration
concerning human rights is the possibility of granting third-party ben-
eficiary rights. The role of third parties in international human rights
is critical to foster a culture of compliance in monitoring and main-
taining commitments and in remedying violations. By incorporating
third parties' rights in international agreements, noncontracting par-
ties can assist in conflict resolution over human rights abuses, mini-
mizing the chances for abuses to go uncorrected.
With the advent of corporate liability for human rights violations,
one need not resolve the perennial question of whether the role of
multinational corporations is to participate in some grand vision of
the good society or to remain steadfastly focused on shareholder
wealth maximization. From either vantage point, corporations should
seek to avoid the costs of human rights liability and share that cost
with others. Arbitrating human rights is a vehicle to invest in a vision
of the good society and maximize a corporation's return on its inter-
national investments.
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